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Abstract
We exploit for defensive purposes the concept of darkports – the unused ports on active systems. We
are particularly interested in such ports which transition to become active (i.e., become trans-darkports).
Darkportsareidentiﬁedbypassivelyobservingandcharacterizingtheconnectivitybehaviorofinternalhosts
in a network as they respond to both legitimate connection attempts and scanning attempts. Darkports can
be used to detect sophisticated scanning activity, enable ﬁne-grained automated defense against automated
malware attacks, and detect real-time changes in a network that may indicate a successful compromise. We
show, in a direct comparison with Snort, that darkports offer a better scanning detection capability with
fewer false positives and negatives. Our results also show that the network awareness gained by the use
of darkports enables active response options to be safely focused exclusively on those systems that directly
threaten the network. Finally, our evaluation of darkports using three different network datasets illustrates
that they are scalable and offer the ability to rapidly characterize and group hosts in a network into different
exposure proﬁles that can be used to detect successful compromises or unauthorized network activity.
1 Introduction
The Internet is saturated with “nonproductive” network trafﬁc that includes an estimated 25 billion global
intrusion attempts per day [22, 39]. A precursor to most of these intrusion attempts involves some form of
reconnaissance activity to identify vulnerable systems or to determine the best point of access into a target
network. Automated tools methodically probe large blocks ofInternet address space seeking vulnerable systems
for recruitment into botnets [9, 25, 6, 24, 2]. Large numbers of worm-infected systems randomly scan the
Internet searching for susceptible systems to exploit. Perhaps most worrisome for a network operator is when
a determined adversary directs speciﬁc scanning activity solely against their network searching for weaknesses
to provide them with an entry vector. This type of reconnaissance is typically precise, deliberate, and focused.
A variety of complex heuristics have been successfully developed to detect scanning activity including
the observation of connection failures [12, 29], statistical measures [13, 31], abnormal network behaviors
[34, 37, 7], and connections to network darkspace [8, 19]. Current scanning detection algorithms focus largely
on observing and classifying external network behavior (i.e. incoming network connection attempts) to de-
tect scanning systems, although many types of sophisticated scanning techniques (e.g. botnet scanning, slow
scanning) make it difﬁcult or impossible to accurately determine root-cause origins of scanning activity.
In contrast, exposure maps [35] were proposed to detect scanning activity by passively observing legiti-
mate trafﬁc and attack scans (active scanning) directed at a target, and especially observing how internal hosts
respond to external connection attempts. Preliminary investigation suggested they were suitable for detecting
sophisticated scanning activity directed at an enterprise network, with greater interest in what an adversary is
searching for, than in who is scanning the network. Successful connections to internal systems would be char-
acterized in exposure maps to deﬁne the currently active external interface to the network. In contrast to remote
network security auditing techniques (e.g. Nmap [10]), exposure maps were asserted to facilitate an efﬁcient,
low-effort method to identify network vulnerabilities, with exposure status continually updated.
In this paper, we pursue these ideas and introduce darkports which we deﬁne as unused ports (i.e. ports with
no service responding) located on active hosts. Darkports provide a method to detect in real-time unauthorized
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1service offerings from a host; these may indicate a successful compromise (e.g. a darkport suddenly starts to
respond to a connection request). We propose a number of applications of exposure maps, and discuss our
results and experiences of using exposure maps and darkports in three different network environments that
range in size from less than a hundred to hundreds of thousands of users: (1) a lab network with a well-deﬁned
security policy and small user population, (2) a university network with a medium-sized user population (i.e. a
thousand users), and (3) abackbone network. Ourexperiments are designed to explore the different applications
of exposure maps.
First, we validate a preliminary assertion from our position paper [35] that exposure maps are very effective
at detecting both simple and sophisticated TCP scanning activity directed at an enterprise network. In a direct
comparison, our scanning detection capability was signiﬁcantly better than the well-known Snort [28]. Expo-
sure maps exhibited both lower false negative and positive rates during our evaluation, and provided the ability
to detect additional sophisticated scanning activity directed at the network.
Secondly, we show that the identiﬁcation of darkports during the construction of the exposure maps pro-
vides network-centric knowledge enabling ﬁne-grained automated responses, e.g. to identify and deny speciﬁc
systems network access when they are found to be performing scanning activity and thereafter trying to ac-
cess a legitimate service on a host in the network (common behavior for autorooters and worms [23]). This
introduces the ability of selective automated response: a focused real-time active response option that limits
the introduction of new access control rules to deny those scanning systems directly threatening network assets
(i.e. those targeting actual services offered by the network). We emphasize the subtle point, that systems that
scan for services not offered by the network are simply identiﬁed (i.e. scan attempt recorded) but otherwise
ignored (e.g. no access control rule introduced to block the associated source IP address). This ability to initi-
ate selective automated response reduces network conﬁguration changes, complexity errors (e.g. by avoiding a
dramatic increase in router/ﬁrewall rules, and possibly leading to a self-imposed denial of service), and avoids
unnecessary performance degradation of network security devices [4, 38].
Thirdly, we illustrate how exposure maps may be used on both enterprise and backbone networks to log-
ically classify systems into exposure proﬁles that identify and group systems according to the services they
offer. We discuss the practical application of exposure proﬁles and how they can be used to identify malicious
network activity (e.g. botnets and worm outbreaks). The technique requires very little computational overhead
and easily scales to large enterprise environments or even backbone networks (see Section 6).
Exposure maps and darkports differ from current scanning detection techniques as they rely on identifying
the services offered by the network instead of tracking external connection events. The result is a scanning
detection technique in which the utilized system detection state does not grow in proportion to the amount
and ﬂuctuation of external network trafﬁc, but rather increases only with the number of services offered by
the network, regardless of the size of the network and the external network activity. This obviates the need
for shrinking time windows or timeouts to accommodate increases or bursts in network trafﬁc, allowing scan
detection with a footprint of a single packet or a frequency of hours or days between probes. As an added
beneﬁt, maintaining information about internal hosts in the network instead of external host activity provides
the necessary network-awareness to answer in real-time questions that should be asked after a scan is detected,
such as“What information has been revealed as aresult of the scan?”, and “Hasthe network behavior changed?”
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reﬁnes the basic idea of exposure maps and
darkports. Section 3 discusses how exposure maps can be used for a variety of security applications. Section 4
describes our implementation, and the evaluation datasets and methodology. Section 5 presents our evaluation
results, including acomparison toSnort, and discussion ofadvanced scanning heuristics. Section 6discusses the
scalability and stability of exposure maps, including resilience to attacks. Section 7 presents further discussion
and limitations. Section 8 reviews related work. We conclude in Section 9. Appendix A contains supporting
data and analysis of a distributed scan.
22 Exposure Maps and Darkports
We ﬁrst describe the constituent components of exposure maps, how exposure maps are constructed and how
they deﬁne the darkports within the network. We focus on exposure maps relative to TCP ports; for UDP see
Section 7.
COMPONENT DESCRIPTION. Exposure maps passively identify the services which have been conﬁrmed
(through an observed response during a training period) as being offered by the hosts of a given network. TCP
packets with the SYN ﬂag set start the three-way connection handshake. When a connection request is sent to a
speciﬁc destination IP address/port, if a service is bound to that port and the port is listening (open), the target
host response is a packet with SYN ACK ﬂag set, to start a session. Listening services, because they respond to
connection attempts or incoming packets, leak information to scanners; they typically correspond to the active
ports in a network and can be tracked in terms of what we deﬁne below as the HEMand the NEM. Once veriﬁed
as permitted activity, the HEMs and NEM deﬁne the authorized access to individual hosts and the network.
More speciﬁcally, a host exposure map (HEM), associated with a ﬁxed IP address (host), is the set of ports
observed responding to external connection attempts within a predeﬁned period. For each active host i in the
network, HEMi is a set of elements each of which begins with the IP address of i, followed by a port number
j; there is such an element for each portj that has responded to a connection attempt within a predeﬁned period.
In symbols, we can abbreviate this as HEMi =
 
IPi : portj
   
  portj was observed responding
 
.
The HEMis the externally visible interface of a host and can be considered to represent information leakage
from the host that may reveal characteristics that can be used to exploit it. Subsequent to the training period, as
additional ports respond to external connection attempts, by deﬁnition the HEM is augmented by these ports.
The network exposure map (NEM) is deﬁned as the collection of HEMs in a given network N at any given
point in time. The NEM deﬁnes how we expect the network to respond to external connection attempts. In
symbols, NEMN =
 
i N HEMi. We will often drop the subscript N in NEMN when the target network is
implied by context. This also allows the natural deﬁnition of NEMS for any subnetwork S   N, i.e. where S
is a subset of the populated IP addresses in N.
In an implementation, once the NEM has been built, the individual HEMs that comprise it can be checked
for compliance with the network security policy. A NEM that complies with the network security policy is
called a vetted NEM. We assume that any service (IP address/port pair) not compliant with the network secu-
rity policy will, once detected, either be shutdown, or implicitly becomes part of the security policy. Thus,
movement from a NEM to a vetted NEM is always possible.
We deﬁne the darkports on a given (real) host as those ports that have not been observed offering any
services, and thus are not expected to accept external connection requests.1 The set of darkports for a host is
the complement of its HEM. The set of darkports for a network is the union of the darkports on all its populated
hosts. For example, a host with a HEM of only three TCP ports 22, 80, and 443 would have 216   3 TCP
darkports i.e., all TCP ports excluding these three. If a darkport responds to an external connection attempt, it
becomes a trans-darkport. This occurs either when a host offers a new service (whether authorized or rogue), or
a connection is made to a service that was not accessed during the training period. Either event causes the HEM
to expand, and by deﬁnition the NEM expands and will differ from the vetted NEM. Once a trans-darkport is
detected, this change can be checked against the network security policy so that the vetted NEM can be updated
or any unauthorized service can be stopped.
EXPOSURE MAP CONSTRUCTION AND MAINTENANCE. In summary, exposure maps are created by
passively observing a target network’s responses to incoming connection attempts (both legitimate connections
and scanning attempts) over a training period. Every time a host responds to an external TCP connection
attempt, the IP address and port of the host offering the service is recorded. During the training period, each
host in the network will reveal services that it offers; the corresponding ports are recorded in its HEM. After the
training period, the vetted NEMcan be used to identify all the active hosts on the network by their representative
1Although a connection attempt to any port at a darkspace IP address (no hosts assigned) will not accept a connection attempt, we
restrict the term darkport to unused ports on a populated host address.
3HEMs. Thereafter during ordinary network operation, passive observation of network packets continues, and
for each connection attempt (i.e., each TCPSYN packet) compliance with the vetted NEMis tested in real-time.
If the services offered by a host expand beyond the vetted NEM, an alert is generated to provide notiﬁcation
that trans-darkports have been detected; this indicates to the network operator that either the vetted NEM needs
to be updated, or some form of unauthorized activity is occurring.
In general, an important consideration for any technique that requires a training period is that any existing
malicious activity (e.g. unauthorized services) may become part of the baseline. In our particular case, a HEM
can be veriﬁed against an existing network security policy to detect any unauthorized service offerings by the
host. The required length of the training period will vary with each network environment depending on a
number of factors including number of active hosts, network security policy, permitted user applications, and
frequency of service usage; see Section 6 for further discussion.
3 Applications of Exposure Maps and Darkports
Exposure maps provide network-centric knowledge sufﬁcient to enable a variety of security applications.
Among these, the subsections below discuss scanning detection, automated response, network discovery and
asset classiﬁcation, and large event detection and identiﬁcation.
3.1 Scanning Detection Using Exposure Maps
MOTIVATION. Panjwani et al. estimate that 50% of attacks against systems are preceeded by some form of
network scanning activity [23]. Current scanning detection algorithms are generally designed to identify and
classify suspicious network activity as scanning activity using attribution to a particular source or sources.
These algorithms are effective at detecting wide-range reconnaissance activities that can be deﬁned as the rapid
scanning of large blocks of Internet addresses in the search for a speciﬁc service or vulnerability. This is
characteristic of autorooters [32] and worm propagation. Autorooters are composite tools that augment basic
port scanning functionality by launching an attack as soon as an open port is located on a target system [1];
they are often used for the rapid enrollment of vulnerable systems into botnets of tens or hundreds of thousands
of compromised systems [2]. Simple scanning worms propagate by indiscriminately probing the Internet as
rapidly as possible to locate and infect vulnerable systems. Scans from autorooters and scanning worms can
usually be attributed to the true source as the scans themselves are the ﬁrst stage of the actual exploit attempt
(e.g. a response, from the target, to a TCP SYN connection request will start the exploit in the same session).
In contrast to such indiscriminate scanning, skilled adversaries will go to considerable lengths to mask their
activities. Numerous sophisticated scanning techniques allow stealthy, focused scanning of a predetermined
target (host and/or network); some of these make attribution to the scanning source impractical, rendering most
current scanning detection techniques ineffective. The following techniques belong to this category.
Slow scanning activity against a network or host can be spread out over days or weeks. Over time, these
scans will simply be lost in the network noise, never exceeding scanning detection thresholds (i.e. being outside
of the allocated detection system state).
Indirect scanning occurs when an attacker uses one system (or systems) to scan a target and another system
to attack the target. This separation defeats attribution attempts. If the scanning activity from the scanning sys-
tem is detected (e.g. blocked at a network router, or by system administrator intervention), the attacker simply
uses another scanning system. A slightly more sophisticated variation uses throw-away scanning systems, i.e.
previously compromised systems that have little value to an attacker other than being able to provide a dispos-
able platform to perform tasks. Any scanning activity traced back to the source, will be attributed to the owner
of the compromised system.
Distributed scanning occurs when multiple systems act in unison using a divide and conquer strategy to
scan a network or host of interest. Typically, one system will act as a central node and collect the scanning
results from all participating systems. Distributing the scanning activity reduces the scanning footprint from
any single system and thus reduces the likelihood of detection. An extreme version of distributed scanning
4involves an attacker using a botnet to scan a target in a coordinated manner resulting in very stealthy scans. A
relatively small botnet of a few thousand systems can be used to scan thousands of ports or hosts with only a
single packet sent from each bot (all with unique IP addresses).
USE OF EXPOSURE MAPS FOR SCANNING DETECTION. A vetted NEM is constructed as previously
described. A connection attempt to any port-IP combination not present in the vetted NEM (i.e. a darkport or
darkspace) is deﬁned as an atomic scan event. The 5-tuple (source IP, destination IP, destination port, protocol,2
timestamp) of any atomic scan events is recorded for further analysis to secondary storage (hard disk) in the
scanning activity log ﬁle. This approach requires only that the NEM information be maintained in system
detection state (not the darkports or external connection requests), thus allowing detection of even very slow
or distributed scans, using only a small amount of main memory (see Section 6). In contrast to most scanning
detection techniques that rely on the identiﬁcation and correlation of external connection events to detect scans,
wethus do not require strategies like reducing the detection time window in which connection events are tracked
or timeouts, to accommodate network trafﬁc ﬂuctuations.
NEM
(A)
(E)
Darkports
Darkspace
Figure 1: Scanning Potentials versus Network Exposures.
(E) denotes potential scans. (A) denotes actual scans.
To fully scan all the TCP services on
a network of n hosts a scanning tool would
need to scan E = n 216 ports. For instance,
in a Class C or /24 network (254 hosts ex-
cluding broadcast addresses),   224 unique
TCP port/host pairs could be scanned. In
practice, often only a subset of available
ports is scanned, as attackers try to lo-
cate well-known services in the reserved
port range (i.e. 0-1023) or backdoor trojan
ports listening on ephemeral ports. Let A
be the actual number of services scanned
in a network, i.e. the number of unique
IP/port combinations of all the detected
scans. Within A, each atomic scan event can result in one of three possible outcomes: (1) a probe directed
against a darkspace address, (2) a probe against a darkport (note: such a host has a HEM), or (3) a probe sent
to a host on an active port (an entry in the NEM). Figure 1 shows the general relationship between the potential
service ports scanned (E), actual service ports scanned (A), darkports scanned, and the NEM for a network.
Unlike most attribution-based scanning detection techniques, the scanning detection approach does not
rely on identiﬁcation of the scanning source to detect scans against a network. Thus, it can detect certain
classes of sophisticated scanning techniques that make determining the root cause of the scanning activity
impractical. However, this approach does not preclude us from the use of some form of attribution post scan
detection. Scanning worm propagation and autorooters are two prevalent examples of scanning activities where
immediately denying the scanning source access to the network is both relevant and important. In these cases,
a successful scan (i.e. one triggering a response from a host) typically leads to an immediate attack from the
scanning systems (see Section 5.2). Other post scan detection activities may include the use of heuristics to
classify atomic scan events into their respective scanning campaigns. An example of such a heuristic is given
in Section 5.1.2 to identify and correlate the atomic scan events that comprise a distributed scan.
3.2 Automated Response using Exposure Maps
Exposure maps can be used in an automated response application as follows. When a new connection request
is observed, the destination IP address and port are compared with the vetted NEM to determine if there is a
match (see Figure 2). If there is no match to an entry in the NEM, the connection is considered a scan and the
source IP address is added as an element in a scanners list (implemented e.g., using a hash table). The 5-tuple
2Here, the protocol is TCP or UDP.
5(as in Section 3.1) that characterizes the connection attempt is then recorded as an atomic scan event in the
scanning activity log ﬁle.
On the other hand if there is a match, the source IP is checked against the scanners list. If the source IP
address matches an entry in the list, the 5-tuple that characterizes this connection attempt is recorded and con-
nection should be dropped as this entity has previously undertaken reconnaissance activity against the network.
Our implementation is passive and only produces alerts that could enable some form of containment (e.g. ACL
change), but does not actually do the latter; one option would be to integrate this application on a network
device capable of performing containment such as a ﬁrewall. If the source IP address does not match an entry
in the scanners list, the connection is permitted; the entity has no previous history of scanning activity and is
connecting to a valid service offered by the network.
Figure 2: Exposure Map Automated Response Logic.
The vetted NEM provides context to determine
if an incoming connection request is part of a scan-
ning campaign and whether it will likely elicit a re-
sponse. This information provides us with the preci-
sion to limit containment to (e.g., automatically block)
only those scanning systems targeting services offered
by the network (see Section 5.2). Containment could
alternately be performed using a number of network
devices including ﬁrewalls, routers, or intrusion pre-
vention systems using current scanning detection tech-
niques. However, given the prevalence of scanning ac-
tivity, frequent dynamic updates to these core network
devices would be required in order to stop attacks in
real-time, and would pose a number of challenges. For instance, Bobyshev et al. [4] have shown that the size
of access control lists (ACLs) and the frequency of dynamic updates can signiﬁcantly impact router CPU uti-
lization and forwarding capabilities. Furthermore, the addition of multiple blocking rules may make ACLs and
conﬁguration ﬁles cumbersome and hard to vet by network personnel. In fact, frequent conﬁguration changes
to these network devices may actually decrease the overall security posture of the network over time [38]. Our
technique allows a precise active response option to be taken exclusively against the most critical known threats
to the network namely, those scanning systems targeting services offered by the network. Scanning systems
trying to access services not offered by the network are noted (i.e. in the scanning activity log and the scanners
list) but no action is needed or taken to block the connection.
Our analysis on a four-week network data set reveals a majority of scanning attempts directed against
services not offered by the network (see later discussion of Figure 3). In the instances when the scanning was
directed against a service offered by the network, an attack always followed (see Table 4 and discussion in
Section 5.2). Thus, our approach can signiﬁcantly reduce the frequency and number of updates to the ACLs of
network security devices while providing a measured and robust security response to real-time threats.
3.3 Exposure Proﬁles: Host Discovery and Asset Classiﬁcation
In large network environments, it may be useful to discern the number and types of systems within the network
which offer services to external entities and logically group them together. Exposure maps provide a mechanism
to identify and group hosts that offer similar services into the same exposure proﬁles. As an example, the
following four exposure proﬁles could be generated based on the perceived risk to the network:
1. Low Risk: web, DNS, mail, printing, network management.
2. Medium Risk: open proxies, P2P services.
3. High Risk: known worms, known trojan backdoors.
4. Unknown: ephemeral ports that do not correspond to a well known application or service.
6In general, the exposure proﬁles used would vary greatly in terms of the number and types of services
in each, depending on the speciﬁc network. In our example, the low risk proﬁle includes only well-known
traditional services offered by the host. The medium risk proﬁle indicates hosts that offer non-malicious but
potentially risky services. The high risk proﬁle denotes those systems that offer a service on a port that has
known malicious activity associated to it. Finally, the unknown proﬁle contains those hosts that offer services
on high order ports that do not correspond to a well-known application or service. Logically grouping hosts by
the contents of their HEMs provides a means to rapidly apply some action to a collection of similar systems
if required (e.g. deny network access to hosts in the high risk proﬁle to limit potential malicious activity).
Furthermore, a change to a host’s darkports may move it from one proﬁle to another and necessitate some
real-time action be taken on that speciﬁc host.
3.4 Large Event Detection and Identiﬁcation
In contrast to the previous three applications for exposure maps, we now discuss one for which we do not
provide any direct experimental evidence in Section 5. In some network environments in which the services
offered to external users are tightly controlled, the vetted NEM and darkports will remain static. In other
environments, the NEM may change frequently due to a relaxed network security policy that allows hosts in
the network to use and offer a variety of services and applications. In the latter situation, it would be common
for darkports to become trans-darkports and be reﬂected in the NEM. Regardless of the type of network, the
ordinary NEMmaintenance generates alerts are generated when a trans-darkport is detected. These alerts can be
viewed by a network operator or alternately processed by some form of software heuristic designed to correlate
events or detect “large events”. The following scenario shows how trans-darkports (and thus changes to HEMs
and the NEM) can provide insight into ongoing large-scale network activity.
Assume the exposure map technique is deployed in a backbone or loosely controlled network, wherein users
are permitted to install a variety of applications and services on their system. During the course of monitoring,
a number of alerts are generated indicating that the same trans-darkport was detected on a number of systems
simultaneously (e.g. port 6667, IRC). Such a change in activity on a multitude of systems within a very short
time period indicates some form of coordinated communication has occurred (e.g. responding to command and
control sessions as part of a botnet). This method of monitoring trans-darkports to allow real-time network
change detection may be best used after logically assigning hosts to exposure proﬁles as per Section 3.3.
4 Evaluation: Datasets and Methodology
To evaluate how darkport observation can be applied in different network environments, we developed and
tested a software implementation. The software is installed on a commodity PC connected to the network by a
10/100 network interface card. The three different network datasets used for testing ranged from a small very
secure network to the equivalent of an ISP backbone link.
CCSL DATASET. The CCSL network is a small university research network of 62 Internet reachable
addresses connected to a university Internet accessible Class B network. All systems access the Internet through
a ﬁrewall not permitting inbound connections unless initiated by an internal system. The CCSL dataset consists
of four weeks (September 2006) of network trafﬁc collected in pcap ﬁles in front of the network ﬁrewall.
M2C DATASET. Measuring, Modeling and Cost Allocation (MC2) is a project involving a variety of
institutes in the Netherlands that provides apublicly accessible repository of anonymized packet header network
trace data [14]. The repository contains header-only network traces from three speciﬁc network locations, with
source and destination IP addresses anonymized using tcpdpriv [18]. We selected 21 network traces from
network location 3, a gigabit link to a Dutch academic and research network for over 1000 students and staff;
these network traces compose seven full days of network activity in November 2003.
MAWI DATASET. The WIDE project [36] operates a nation-wide research and development testbed in
Japan, interconnected to a number of similar testbeds around the globe. The WIDE working group Measure-
ment and Analysis on the WIDE Internet (MAWI) [16] has a publicly available packet trace repository taken
7from a number of sampling points. We used traces from samplepoint-F, a 100Mbps trans-Paciﬁc link, and
speciﬁcally only 15 minute network traces taken in November 2006 at the same time every day over a contigu-
ous one week period; the source and destination IP addresses were anonymized using a modiﬁed tcpdpriv [17]
(see discussion in Section 7). An average of 235K unique IP addresses are observed in each network trace ﬁle.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY. To test the scalability of various applications of exposure maps, it was
important to understand how they would react in large network environments with a diverse user population
using a variety of software applications. Accordingly, we evaluated the scalability of the prototype on the M2C
and MAWI datasets. These datasets only contain anonymized packet headers; the type of obfuscation used
on the source and destination IP addresses is consistent within a single network trace but not across multiple
network traces (see Section 7). For such datasets, the concept of training period is not applicable (i.e. the same
host communications in different network traces may be mapped to different IP addresses), and the scanning
detection application was not evaluated on them. However, the volume of network trafﬁc and diversity of the
user population in these datasets makes them ideal to test NEM scalability as well as the logical grouping of
hosts into exposure proﬁles. To complement these tests, we tested scanning detection and selected automated
response capabilities on the CCSL network dataset; its network boundaries are known, allowing the NEM to
be validated against a known network security policy. Additionally, having access to the full network traces,
post scan detection analysis was possible to conﬁrm our experimental results when comparing actual scanning
detection capability with Snort.
5 Evaluation Results
We ﬁrst tested the ability of exposure maps to perform scanning detection by performing a side-by-side compar-
ison with Snort [28]. We then show how exposure maps can be used to detect sophisticated scanning activity;
analyze the effectiveness of using the exposure map scanning detection capabilities to perform a real-time ﬁne-
grained automatic response to attacks; and validate the network discovery and asset identiﬁcation feature of
exposure proﬁles in both a medium-sized enterprise and ISP peering point network environment.
5.1 Results: Scanning Detection
As discussed, the CCSL network dataset has a NEM comprised of three HEMs (see Table 1). Two of these have
three active ports; the third has one active port. The NEM thus has in total seven port/IP entries.
5.1.1 Scanning Detection Comparison with Snort
We compared scanning detection results with Snort on the CCSL network dataset. We used a one-day training
period to construct the NEM; it stabilized within the ﬁrst 20 hours of network trafﬁc. Snort’s preprocessor,
sfPortscan [27], performs port scanning detection and allows operations on decoded packets before they are sent
on to the Snort detection engine. sfPortscan provides the capability to detect TCP, UDP, and ICMP scanning;
its sensitivity is set using the sense level parameter (low, medium, or high). We focused on TCP scans at sense
level high. Three types of scans were detected by Snort in the CCSL dataset: 1) portscans (single host scans
multiple ports on a single host); 2) distributed portscans (multiple hosts scan multiple ports on a single host);
and 3) portsweeps (single host scans a single port on multiple hosts).
The implementation detected 740885 atomic TCP connection events (scans). Figure 3 shows the relation-
ship between legitimate connections attempts and TCP scanning attempts. The upper bound on the possible
TCP scanning footprint is E = 62 216. The actual scanning footprint we detected was A = 2342 unique TCP
port/IP combinations (including all seven entries in the NEM). With 26 live systems in the network, the number
of darkports is DP = 26   216   7 (the seven entries in the NEM are excluded). To compare exposure maps
with Snort, we applied Snort’s scan deﬁnitions to group the scans3 we detected.
3Recall that a scan is deﬁned by the NEM as an atomic TCP connection attempt.
8Host TCP Ports Description
10.0.0.1 25, 631, 993 SMTP/IPP/IMAP
10.0.0.2 22, 80, 443 SSH/HTTP/SSL
10.0.0.3 22 SSH
Table 1: Details about NEM for CCSL network.
Snort Exposure
Maps
Port Scans 127+1 127
Distributed Port Scans 54+14 54
PortSweeps 7871+42 7871
Other Scans 0 461
False Positives (total) 57 0
False Negatives 461 0
Unique Scanners 322 813
Table 2: Scanning Detection Comparison.
“+n” are scans that are false positives.
Snort detects scans by counting RST packets from each perceived target during a predetermined timeout
interval [15]. Before declaring a scan, 5 events (i.e. RST packets) are required from a given target within a
window. The sliding timeout window varies from 60 to 600 seconds by sensitivity level; at the highest level, an
alert will be generated if the 5 events are observed within 600 seconds. Exposure maps do not employ a timeout
window; the 5-tuple of atomic scan events are simply recorded and stored, whereafter a number of heuristics
can be used to classify the scans detected (see Section 5.1.2). On the other hand, Snort does not require a
training period for scanning detection.
Table 2 summarizes the results. Snort detected a total of 8052 scans initiated by 322 unique scanning
systems, while the NEM detected 8513 scans initiated by 813 unique scanning systems – all of the 8052
scans detected by Snort, and an additional 461 scans initiated by 461 unique systems not identiﬁed by Snort.
These are denoted other scans in Table 2; they encompass a variety of scanning techniques not included in the
sfPortscan scanning deﬁnitions, e.g., scans from a single host to a single port on a single host, slow scans with
scan intervals of greater than 15 minutes, and a single host scanning multiple ports on multiple hosts. In the
next section, we discuss in detail some heuristics used to detect distributed scans. 57 of the scans Snort detected
were false positives, the majority caused by legitimate RST packets traversing the network. At the high sense
level, a moderate amount of false positives are expected by normal network activity.
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Figure 3: Scanning Activity Directed at the CCSL Net-
work.
FALSE NEGATIVES. We relied on the output of
Snort to provide a baseline of the scanning activ-
ity within the dataset. As mentioned, we detected
all scans identiﬁed by Snort, plus another 461 scans
which Snort missed. Thus relative to Snort, for this
dataset, our analysis for exposure maps (Table 2) re-
vealed no false negatives.
Exposure maps (once vetted against the security
policy) deﬁne the authorized access to the network
from external sources. Connections attempts or scans
outside these maps are considered a possible scans.
Scans directed against aport/IP combination contained
in the NEM are not considered a scan but rather a con-
nection attempt to a valid service; this might poten-
tially then be a source of false negatives, and to claim
otherwise (i.e. zero false negatives in general) would
imply unknowable knowledge of the intent of the party
requesting the connection. For instance, a scan to port 443 of host 10.0.0.2 (see Table 1) in the CCSL network
would not be recorded as a scan. In practice, although this speciﬁc event in a scanning campaign would not be
detected, the overall scanning campaign would likely be detected using exposure maps for scan detection, as in
9most cases we would expect with high probability scans to occur against other hosts in the network not offering
SSL (i.e. port 443 darkports). Scanning activity directed solely at the HTTP server would remain undetected
and be a source of false negatives. However, we expect that would be an actual attack rather than scanning
activity; we do not claim that exposure maps can detect attacks (that are not preceded by scans).
FALSE POSITIVES. Through user error or misconﬁguration, a connection attempt might be made to a host
or service not offered by the network. In this instance, the intent of the connection attempt was not to scan
some portion of the network, but rather it is simply a failed attempt to access a legitimate service. Regardless,
this activity would be classiﬁed as a scan as an attempt was made to connect to a host/port pair not listed in
the NEM. Again, given that there is no way to measure the intent of a connection attempt, we must classify
these events as scans. While no false positives occurred in our CCSL dataset test (vs. 57 by Snort), we do
not claim this in general. False positives will be generated whenever new legitimate services are introduced
on the network or services are utilized which were not accessed during the training period (with identiﬁcation
as a trans-darkport until the service has been added to the vetted NEM). We expect trans-darkports to occur
infrequently in tightly controlled enterprise environments (e.g. in most government departments, ﬁnancial, and
health care).
5.1.2 Exposure Map Advanced Scanning Detection
Recalling Fig. 2, the scanning detection application identiﬁes connection attempts to darkports within a net-
work, with a 5-tuple extracted from each atomic scan event and recorded in a log ﬁle, from which a number
of heuristics can be developed to help classify and correlate these events into respective scanning campaigns.
Here, we give a few examples of such heuristics to detect distributed scanning attempts.
Attackers may disperse the scanning activity among several sources to reduce the overall scanning footprint
in an effort to evade detection. To detect distributed scanning we propose classifying the scan events using the
following criteria. 1) Scanning events and target destination ports. The number of scanning events per unique
source IP address is determined, through analysis of the scanning log, over a conﬁgurable time interval (e.g.
seconds, days). Similar amounts of scanning events from individual sources are grouped into clusters, which
are then grouped by target destination ports. This ﬁnal comparison reveals scanning systems that share the same
scanning frequency (i.e. number of scan packets per unit time) and target service. We consider clusters of three
or more scanning sources that target the same destination ports as a distributed scan; the number of systems in
a cluster is conﬁgurable. 2) Source IP proximity and target destination ports. Scanning events are ﬁrst sorted
by unique source IP address. Scanning sources in the same one-quarter class C subnet address range (e.g. /26)
are grouped into a cluster. These clusters are then grouped by target destination ports. This reveals scanning
systems sharing a similar contiguous address space (which could indicate a single entity 0wns the scanning
systems) and target (i.e. service). Again, we consider clusters of three or more scanning sources that target the
same destination ports as a distributed scan.
Using these distributed scan heuristics, we detected three distributed scans in the CCSL network dataset
(see Table 3). The ﬁrst consisted of three source IPs targeting port 80 (HTTP). The scanning campaign was
directed against the entire IP address range of the CCSL network (i.e. 62 systems). Once the scanning activity
completed, no attacks were detected from these scanning sources. In fact, the only network activity exhibited by
the systems participating in the distributed scanning campaign in the network trace was this speciﬁc distributed
scan. The second distributed scan consisted of 11 systems targeting port 22 (SSH). The scan was also directed
at the entire IP address range. Two of the hosts in the CCSL network offer services on port 22. In contrast to
the ﬁrst distributed scan, two of the scanning systems attacked both systems in the CCSL network that offered
the service (c.f. Table 1). We describe this scanning activity and attack in greater detail in Appendix A.1. The
third distributed scan detected consisted of 9 scanning systems targeting ports 53 (DNS) and 25 (SMTP). Two
of the hosts in the network offer services on ports 25 and 53 respectively. Again, all hosts in the CCSL network
were scanned with an attack immediately following on the system that offered port 25.
The distributed scanning detection heuristics described above illustrates how atomic scan events detected
10# of Scanned # of Hosts Follow-on
Scanners Ports Scanned Attack
3 80 62 No
11 22 62 Yes
9 25, 53 62 Yes
Table 3: Three Detected Distributed Scans.
NEM Entry Scan/Attack Scans or
Entities Attacks
10.0.0.1:25 5 5
10.0.0.1:80 12 18
10.0.0.1:443 3 3
10.0.0.2:22 40 4545
10.0.0.2:80 17 120
10.0.0.2:443 4 9
10.0.0.3:22 40 10601
Table 4: Scan Activity as Prelude to Attack.
and recorded through exposure maps can be processed to detect sophisticated scanning activity. Other heuris-
tics may be developed that use the raw output from exposure maps to identify other types of simple or so-
phisticated scanning activity (e.g. slow scanning). For instance, as an example third heuristic, to detect slow
scans to a particular service (i.e. port) one can use the timestamp feature from the recorded scan events. Some
time-constrained set of detected atomic scan events is sorted by source IP address. Using the timestamp as a
reference, scan intervals of less than 5 minutes from a particular source IP address to the same destination port
are ignored. This heuristic would detect scans from a single host to the same destination port on multiple hosts
with a scan interval of 5 minutes or greater.
5.2 Results: Active Response
Of the 813 scanners detected by the NEMin the CCSL dataset, 66 launched a total of 15301 scans intermingled
with attacks (unsuccessful) against the network, e.g., repeated attempts to relay mail through the mail server,
and attempted logins to an SSH service. Mail relaying is prohibited by our mail server and the responses
from the mail server to the attacking system indicate that no relaying occurred; analysis of the network traces
also showed that the repeated SSH login attempts were all unsuccessful. Some of these systems scanned and
attacked multiple services; this explains why the number of scan/attack entities in Table 4 is 121, while the
actual number of unique IPs addresses was 66. With the exception of a single distributed scan (see Table 3),
two characteristics of this activity occurred: (1) scanning was always the precursor to the actual attack, and
(2) whenever a scan was directed against a service offered by the network (i.e. entry in the NEM), an attack
followed once a response to the scan was sent. This “scan then attack” activity ﬁts the proﬁle of autorooter or
worm activity as previously described. The attacks were directed against four services offered by the network:
SMTP, HTTP, SSL, and SSH.
Without the knowledge of what services are offered and in active use by the network, in a standard perimeter
defense all 813 scanning system source IPs over the four week period might need to be blocked at the router
or ﬁrewall. The NEM provides up-to-date knowledge of the external interface of the network, indicating which
minimal set of scanning systems should be blocked. The NEM, coupled with the technique of Section 3.2,
would require that only 66 source IP addresses be denied access. This represents a 92% reduction in the
number of dynamic updates to the network security ACLs.
5.3 Results: Exposure Proﬁles
Exposure proﬁles offer the ability to passively perform host discovery and identiﬁcation. To determine how
well exposure maps can be used to identify and group hosts with similar HEMs into exposure proﬁles, we
tested this feature on three network traces chosen from each of the M2C and MAWI datasets. We classiﬁed all
the HEMs using the proﬁles of Section 3.3; speciﬁc TCP ports for the types of applications listed in the example
proﬁles are listed in Table 5. These speciﬁc proﬁles were selected to demonstrate the feasibility of using HEMs
11Table 5: Exposure Proﬁles’ TCP Port Assignments
Risk Level Ports
Low 21, 22, 23, 25, 53, 80, 110, 113,
119, 143, 443, 554, 993, 995, 1755,
1863, 5050, 5061, 7000
Medium 1080, 2126, 2128, 3124, 3126-8
3389, 4444, 4660-72, 5555, 6257
6346, 6347, 6348, 6660-9, 6699
6881-9, 7123, 8000, 8080, 5126
5128, 46000, 50500
High 135, 445, 1433, 6969, and other known
malware programs.
Table 6: Exposure Proﬁles
MAWI
Network Trace # of HEMs Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk Unknown
200611091400 7554 6997 106 184 346 (4.6%)
200611101400 8006 7090 147 414 359 (4.5%)
200611111400 5967 4091 475 68 434 (7.3%)
M2C
Network Trace # of HEMs Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk Unknown
20030903-0410 167 58 0 108 1 (.59%)
20030903-1005 685 627 4 34 30 (4.3%)
20030903-1700 470 452 1 0 17 (3.6%)
to group their respective hosts into speciﬁc network proﬁles. Accordingly, the number of proﬁles and speciﬁc
services included in each are conﬁgurable for different network environments.
Exposure proﬁles can be used to rapidly partition hosts based on their HEM into subsets of the NEM.
For instance, Table 6 summarizes the number of HEMs (hosts) within four exposure proﬁles for the selected
network traces from the M2C and MAWI datasets. The Unknown proﬁle refers to HEMs that offer services on
ports not listed in one of the other three proﬁles of Table 5. A HEM’s placement in a proﬁle in this example is
determined by the highest risk service it offers; a HEM that contains entries 22, 80, and 1080 would be included
in the Medium risk proﬁle. In none of Table 6 traces were more 8% of hosts unclassiﬁed (i.e. left over in the
Unknown proﬁle). Inclusion even in this Unknown proﬁle provides valuable information: the corresponding
hosts offer external users some unknown service which may contravene the network security policy. A more
conservative alternative would be to place the Unknown HEMs into the High risk proﬁle.
Exposure proﬁles are useful for other applications. An ISP could use exposure proﬁles in response to global
cyber events (e.g. worm outbreak, new exploit, botnet DDoS attack) creating an applicable proﬁle to identify
hosts that are at risk or exhibiting signs of a successful compromise. Accordingly, to ensure the efﬁcient use
of resources, different monitoring thresholds and security applications could be applied to the subset of hosts
within the network based on their exposure proﬁle. For instance, hosts that belong to a server farm exposure
proﬁle (e.g. hosts that offer HTTP services in a network enclave) might be afforded a different type or greater
level of monitoring than hosts with other exposure proﬁles. At the most basic level, exposure proﬁles could
be used to simply differentiate between clients and servers in a network, or for network operators simply as a
method to discover and baseline the services offered in their network.
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(a) Number of HEMs in the M2C network traces.
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(b) Number of HEMs in the MAWI network traces.
Figure 4: Exposure Map Variation due to Network Activity (best viewed in color).
6 Scalability and Stability of Exposure Maps
The size of exposure maps will be determined by numerous factors, the two most important being the number of
distinct hosts using the monitored link (or network), and the variety of applications those hosts use. We tested
exposure maps on the M2C and MAWI network datasets to determine scalability in larger and more diverse
environments; individual traces were hundreds of thousands of unique source and destination IP addresses.
Table 8 (Appendix A.2) summarizes the number of unique hosts observed in various network traces, the sizes
of the corresponding NEM (in terms of number of IP:port entries), and the number of HEMs (i.e. active hosts
offering a service). In these traces it turned out that the number of HEMs constructed (and thereafter requiring
maintenance and updating) never exceeded 5% of the total number of unique IP addresses. The average HEM
size (corresponding to the number of services offered by a single host) was similar for all network traces and
surprisingly small: less than 1.2 services on average. Apparently, the majority of hosts (servers) offer only
a single service to client systems. Figures 4(a) and 4(b) illustrate how the number of HEMs varies with the
number of distinct IP addresses monitored in the network traces (the y-axis is log scale). The smaller the NEM,
the less detection system state that needs to be maintained and the greater the scalability.
The resource consumption of exposure maps includes system detection state and disk storage. The for-
mer refers to storage for the features extracted from network events that must be maintained at all times in
main memory, providing the wireline speed context to build and maintain the exposure maps as well as per-
form its various applications.4 A number of techniques are used by other network-based scanning detection
approaches to limit their use of allocated system resources (CPU cycles, main memory, disk storage), e.g.,
connection timeouts, reduction of monitoring windows, ﬁxed sized memory buffers and analyzing only certain
events/protocols. The disk storage usage by exposure maps will depend on the detected scanning activity, in-
creasing with the number of atomic scan events recorded. We now discuss the system detection state and disk
storage requirements for the various applications of exposure maps, and computational overhead.
SCANNING DETECTION. For scanning detection with exposure maps, (1) the NEM must be constructed
and maintained, and (2) atomic scan events must be written to disk in the scanning activity log ﬁle. To under-
stand the amount of detection system state for (1), consider the largest NEM observed in Table 8, consisting of
11207 entries (MAWI dataset). Each NEM entry contains six bytes: four for IP address and 2 for port. The
total memory footprint for this NEM is 6   11207   67K bytes plus additional overhead for storage in a data
structure (e.g. hash table, Bloom ﬁlter). Thus with an allocation of 100K or 200K in system detection state, we
4Depletion of this ﬁnite resource, due to trafﬁc volume or an intentional DoS attack, can overload and defeat a detection system.
Resilience to attack is discussed separately; see end of Section 6.
13could perform scanning detection for this link that contained the trafﬁc of 210K unique systems. As new con-
nection requests are received, a single lookup is performed on the NEM with the destination IP and port ﬁelds
from the incoming request to determine if there is a match. The small amount of detection system state coupled
with the minimal computational overhead required to determine if an incoming connection request matches a
port/IP pair in the NEM (i.e. a single lookup) make this technique suitable for use at wire speed even in large
enterprise environments.
To estimate the disk storage required for atomic scan events in the scanning event log ﬁle, we examined the
MAWIand CCSLdatasets. Although thescanning detection technique wasnotapplied to theMAWIdataset, we
can approximate the amount of scanning activity occurring within the network traces by examining the number
of unacknowledged connection requests (i.e. SYN packets); these can occur during normal network activity
(e.g. connection timeouts, resets), but also provide a method to estimate the number of connection attempts to
an unavailable service (i.e. port with no service listening). The largest number of unacknowledged connection
attempts in the MAWI network traces of Table 8 was 190247. The unoptimized 5-tuple that represents each
atomic scan event, in character delimited ASCII, requires 44 bytes of storage. To store one week of scanning
activity for the MAWI dataset (a full 24 hours network trace per day) would require 5.7 Gbytes; or for one
month, 169Gbytes.5 In contrast, to store the 780885 atomic scan events detected in the CCSL dataset (4 week
period) in the scanning activity log ﬁle would take 33Mbytes. Assuming the dataset represents an average level
of scanning activity, an entire year of scanning activity for the CCSL network (  391Mbytes) could be stored
on a single CD or USB key.
Long term event storage is useful for applying heuristics to detect sophisticated scanning activity (e.g.
slow scanning) and scanning trend analysis. Part of our future work includes optimizing the way that atomic
scan events are stored, to signiﬁcantly reduce the disk storage required e.g., through the use of binary output,
scanning event aggregation, and compression.
AUTOMATED RESPONSE. The automated response application is more expensive on system detection state
than the scanning detection application due to the scanners list (recall Section 3.2). Each entry in the scanners
list requires an additional 4 bytes (plus additional overhead for the hash table data structure). As connection
requests are received, an additional lookup is required (i.e. a check against both the NEM and the scanners
list) to determine if the source IP address matches an entry in the scanners list. We detected 831 scanners in
the CCSL dataset. With an additional allocation of less than 4K in system detection state, we could enable the
automated response application. Over time, the scanners list will grow and would have to be managed (reduced)
so that some predetermined limit of system detection state was not exceeded (see Section 7).
EXPOSURE PROFILES. The exposure proﬁle application is the least expensive in terms of system resources.
Tobuild exposure proﬁles, weneed toconstruct and maintain the NEMas forthe scanning detection application.
The HEMs in the NEM are simply sorted and logically grouped by their respective ports into the respective
proﬁles. There is no requirement to write any information to secondary storage.
STABILITY. The stability of a NEM will vary greatly depending on the environment in which it is used.
In an enterprise network with a tight network security policy (e.g. government, ﬁnance, health care), we would
expect the NEM to stabilize quickly and thus be suitable for use in a scanning detection technique. As noted
in Section 5.1.1, in our university lab network the NEM stabilized in 20 hours. In other environments, service
usage may vary by day of the week. In a network environment with an open network security policy, the
NEM may scale but not stabilize as new hosts continually enter and leave the network (e.g. mobile users) and
new applications and services are continually added to client systems (e.g. P2P ﬁle sharing, open proxies).
Furthermore in the core network of an ISP the concept of network boundaries and universal network security
policies are not applicable. In these ﬂuid network environments, exposure maps remain useful, e.g. as a tool to
perform network discovery and asset identiﬁcation through the application of exposure proﬁles, as discussed in
Sections 3.3 and 5.3.
DOS ATTACKS. A potentially serious attack on many scanning detection mechanisms is one that specif-
ically targets the detection system. In this context, we review the general construction and maintenance of
5A commodity external hard disk with this storage capacity costs   $100.
14basic exposure maps, plus the three main applications considered (scanning detection, automated response, and
exposure proﬁles).
The construction and maintenance of basic exposure maps appears resilient to DoS attack. Incoming scans
(bursts or sustained activity) do not increase an exposure map’s size (i.e., the number of HEM entries), which
reﬂects only the number of services offered by the corresponding host. Incoming scans do need to be passively
monitored, and connection requests are checked for matches against the NEM;however, the processing required
for this is minimal, and we would expect any problems caused by volume of requests to cause other elements
of a network to fail, e.g., having adverse affect on core network devices such as routers, or ﬁrewalls. Similar
to basic exposure maps, the exposure proﬁle application appears resilient, as neither disk storage nor system
detection state are adversely affected by attack; exposure proﬁles rely only on exposure maps to logically group
system devices based on the services they offer.
In the scanning detection application, secondary storage may be adversely affected by a large botnet DoS
effort, because detected scanning activity is recorded. For example, for a 100,000 system botnet executing a
scanning campaign on a target network, three simultaneous scans by each bot would consume 13.2Mbytes in
the scanning activity log. A sustained scanning effort by such a botnet would exhaust disk storage in most
networks. However, such an attack would also likely cause core network devices to fail as noted above.
The automated response application would experience the same impact on disk storage as the scanning
detection application, plus system detection state would be consumed for source IP addresses added to the
scanners list (as incoming connection requests to port/IP combinations outside the NEM result in new scanners
list entries). A botnet of size 100,000 would consume 400Kbytes of (scanner list) system detection state; this
state consumption does not increase after the ﬁrst scan from each source IP address. The most successful attack
would likely be an attacker intentionally trying to exhaust scanner list state by spooﬁng source IP addresses
during a large scanning campaign; this could adversely affect the platform executing the automated response
application.
7 Further Discussion and Limitations
INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS. Another application of exposure maps is as follows. As in Section 3.1, each
connection attempt to a darkport is considered a scan against the network and this activity is recorded. Over
time, the scanning activity detected by exposure maps can be analyzed to determine speciﬁc scanning activity
patterns or long-term trends. For instance, a sudden burst in scanning activity directed against a service offered
by the network may prompt the network operator to conﬁrm the patch level for the software associated with that
service. A number of open source security sites could be consulted (e.g. CERT) to determine if the activity may
be the result of an emerging exploit or zero-day vulnerability. In the event no suitable explanation is found, the
network operator may choose to closely monitor activity to the hosts that offer this service until the scanning
activity returns to normal levels.
NON-STANDARD PORTS. Oneof thestrengths of theexposure mapapproach (and all discussed applications
herein) is that it need only maintain very little state when operational. It need not inspect or decode the content
of a TCP connection, but only to observe external connection attempts (i.e. SYN packets) and record the IP
address and source port if there is a response (SYN-ACK). Thus, exposure maps use port numbers to identify
the offered service. Although port numbers are a good indication of the type of service offered, users may
choose to install services that use non-standard ports, e.g., an HTTP server using port 8080 or 8000 instead of
port 80. Of course, use of non-standard ports may limit access as client systems must know the listening port
number before accessing the service. This has the greatest potential impact on exposure proﬁles, which group
systems according to the services they offer; a standard server application using a non-standard port may be
misclassiﬁed into another proﬁle. In the case of creating a NEM for scanning detection, this issue is less of a
concern; non-standard port usage should be detected after training when the NEM is vetted.
MODIFICATIONS FOR UDP EXPOSURE MAPS. Each UDP datagram can be regarded as a discrete event
and a potential new communication between hosts. As UDP is connectionless, other measures must be taken
15to identify and track communications streams between host pairs exchanging packets. For instance, two hosts
observed exchanging UDP datagrams could be considered participating in a session, with the host that initiates
the exchange considered the client. A host that responds (after receiving an initial UDP packet) by sending
back a UDP packet is regarded as a server and its corresponding UDP source port is regarded as open. A HEM
for the UDP protocol, associated with a ﬁxed IP address, is the set of ports observed responding to an initial
incoming UDP packet that signiﬁes the start of a UDP packet exchange.
To implement UDP exposure maps, the ﬁrst occurrence of an incoming UDP packet with a unique source
IP and destination port combination could be kept in state in a sliding time window. The source IP address
and source port of the incoming UDP packets are compared with the destination IP address and destination
port of outgoing UDP packets. When a match occurs, the UDP packet with the earliest timestamp determines
which host initiated the packet exchange and thus is considered the client trying to access a service. Using
this method to determine which host in the communication offers the service (vs. responding to a connection
attempt in TCP), the deﬁnition of NEM, darkports, trans-darkports as well the construction and maintenance of
UDP exposure maps is analogous to that of TCP exposure maps.
ANONYMIZED HEADERS. Two of the network datasets used in our evaluation (i.e. the M2C and MAWI
traces) contained only packet headers, anonymized using tcpdpriv (see Section 5.1), which scrambles IP ad-
dresses to preserve privacy [18, 17] (IP addresses are permuted). It is important that all occurrences of a speciﬁc
IP address are consistently mapped to a single address within a dataset, to allow meaningful analysis of the net-
work trafﬁc. IP mapping consistency between datasets is also desirable for this reason. Longer consistency is
more convenient for analysis but also makes it easier to defeat the anonymization and recover private informa-
tion [5]. The M2C and MAWI datasets did not maintain consistency between datasets so each network trace
must be analyzed separately. Given their short duration, it was not possible to use these datasets as candidates to
validate the scanning detection and automated response capabilities of the technique as even a minimal training
period was not possible. Furthermore, the traces contained no payload information precluding post-evaluation
analysis on the scanning detection results (e.g., false positive and negative analysis).
8 Related Work
The basic idea of exposure maps was introduced in a position paper [35], and developed as an example of an
attribution-free scanning detection technique. Preliminary analysis revealed that it could detect both sophisti-
cated and simple forms of network scanning activity. Although not tested, exposure maps were also proposed to
detect changes in the services offered in a network which a network operator could verify as either authorized
activity or an indication of a successful attack.
Active scanning6 software, both open source and commercial, allows a security audit on a host or network
[10, 33, 26]. Active scanning can be an integral part of a security audit to conﬁrm that a host or network is in
compliance with the network security policy. This activity however, can be costly in terms of human resources
as it requires personnel to perform the required scanning activity (i.e. conﬁgure and operate the software) and
interpret the results. Furthermore, active scanning provides only a snapshot in time of the active hosts and
services in a network. Any new hosts or services offered by the network will only be detected at the next
scheduled active scanning session.
Passive scanning techniques continuously monitor the hosts and services available in a network. Extrusion
detection [3] refers to identiﬁcation of unauthorized internal network activity by inspecting outbound network
trafﬁc; its ultimate goal is the identiﬁcation of outgoing attack attempts from compromised internal systems in
order to stop them from reaching their target. The passive asset detection system (PADS) is signature-based
passive detection software with a rules engine to identify hosts and services running on a network by inspecting
outbound network trafﬁc [30]. It was created to provide supplementary information when performing active
scanning of a network. Snort is an open source IDS that has scanning detection capability [28] through the use
of the Snort preprocessor sfPortscan [27], by observing the RST packets within the network for a predetermined
6Active scanning involves injecting packets into the network in order to elicit some observable response.
16timeout window [15]. If ﬁve RST packets are detected from a suspected target within a conﬁgurable timeout
window, an alert is generated.
Both Leckie et al. [13] and SPICE [31] use probabilistic models to detect scanning activity. These ap-
proaches attempt to assign connection probabilities to internal hosts based on the observation within normal
network trafﬁc conditions as a benchmark. Scanning systems are detected as they are assigned probabilities
based on their current connection behavior which is measured and compared against the a priori connection
probabilities assigned to the internal hosts. Jung et al. [12] use their Threshold Random Walk algorithm to
identify scanning hosts, based on the observation that scanning systems will contact hosts and ports that are not
available more often than benign systems would be.
Network darkspace is the unused IP addresses in a network and thus it should have no legitimate network
activity directed to it; connection attempts to IP addresses that have no hosts assigned to them is considered
anomalous. A number of commercial products (e.g. [19, 8]) make use of network darkspace to detect malicious
network activity. A darknet is typically a large unused block of Internet-routable darkspace monitored for
inbound packet activity. The larger the darknet, the better the darknet’s ability to detect scans and attacks
during an observation period [21, 20]. A related but subtly different approach by Harrop et al. [11] uses
greynets, deﬁned as regions of darknet address space that contain some active systems (i.e. some of the IP
addresses in the darknet are assigned to active hosts). One of the motivations is that it is not possible for
most enterprise network operators to have large regions of contiguous unused address space assigned to them.
However, it would be useful to have some means to detect anomalous events if dark space was available on the
network. Interspersing valid light (i.e. used) and dark (i.e. unused) addresses throughout a network will make
it difﬁcult for malware to avoid targeting greynet addresses and thus avoiding detection.
9 Concluding Remarks
We are the ﬁrst to exploit the use of exposure maps and introduce the concept of darkports. In contrast to
darknets and greynets [11, 8, 19], even densely populated enterprise networks can make use of exposure maps
as they exist on live hosts. The overall exposure map technique is based on a simple premise that is efﬁcient
to implement – it requires the passive observation, recording, and maintenance of a list of the services offered
by the hosts in a network. This simplicity translates into a very efﬁcient use of system detection state and
computational resources that easily scales for use in large enterprise and backbone networks.
Exposure maps can be used to perform scanning detection, enable ﬁne-grained automated responses to
deny access only to those scanning systems that directly threaten hosts in the network, and identify potentially
infected systems through the classiﬁcation into exposure proﬁles based on the services they offer. During our
evaluation, our implementation of the exposure map scanning detection application had fewer false positives
and negatives in a direct side-by-side comparison with Snort. The exposure map scanning detection approach,
through the passive recording of all the services offered by the network, provides an awareness of active hosts,
network darkspace, and darkports allowing network-centric context that increases the ﬁdelity of scanning de-
tection.
In an open network environment, the diversity of user population and permitted activity may make the
enforcement of a single comprehensive network security policy impractical. Furthermore, mobile or transient
users may make determining a stable baseline of all the services offered by hosts in the network infeasible. In
such environments, exposure maps remain ﬂexible enough to be conﬁgured to monitor a subset of the network
to protect core network assets. A NEM could be composed of a single HEM (e.g., primary web server or for
host-based intrusion detection) or several HEMs (e.g., web server farm), allowing a network operator to focus
on these mission critical servers. We have developed a full implementation of this approach in software that we
plan to make available to the public.
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A Supporting Material
A.1 Anatomy of a Distributed Scan
In this section, we discuss one of the distributed scans summarized in Table 3. The actual date of the scan was
September 9, 2006. Using the source IP proximity and target destination ports heuristic (see Section 5.1.2), we
detected three (unexpected) distributed scanning campaigns in the CCSL dataset. One of these was executed
by a set of 11 scanning systems working in concert targeting the same destination port on all hosts in the target
network.
Atomic Scan Events
18:01:30 10.0.138.232 > 192.168.1.3.22
18:01:30 10.0.138.237 > 192.168.1.6.22
18:01:30 10.0.138.229 > 192.168.1.9.22
18:01:30 10.0.138.237 > 192.168.1.2.22
18:01:30 10.0.138.229 > 192.168.1.10.22
18:01:30 10.0.138.226 > 192.168.1.14.22
18:01:30 10.0.138.236 > 192.168.1.18.22
18:01:30 10.0.138.230 > 192.168.1.24.22
18:01:30 10.0.138.234 > 192.168.1.16.22
18:01:30 10.0.138.234 > 192.168.1.11.22
Table 7: Distributed Scan Characteristics.
All 62 systems (targets) received a single connec-
tion request to port 22 (SSH). The number of atomic
scan events from the 11 scanning systems ranged from
2 to 7. The network address space was scanned in
non-sequential order and the entire scan lasted 1 sec-
ond. Table 7 summarizes the characteristics of this dis-
tributed scan. Table 7 shows the ﬁrst 10 scans of the
scanning campaign. During the entire campaign, the
source IP address varies among the 11 scanning hosts
with no occurrence of two atomic scan events arriving
one directly after the other from the same source IP.
Approximately 2 minutes after the scan concluded, 2
of the systems that participated in the distributed scan
attacked (unsuccessfully)7 precisely the two systems
in the network that offered SSH.
7Analysis of the network traces showed that the repeated SSH login attempts were all unsuccessful (see Section 5.2).
19A.2 Exposure Maps Constructed From the MAWI and M2C Datasets
Table 8 provides supporting material referenced by the scalability discussion in Section 6.
Table 8: Exposure Maps Constructed From the MAWI and M2C Datasets.
MAWI
Network Trace Unique NEM # of Avg HEM File Size
IPs Size HEMs Size(services) GBytes
0611091400 240377 8105 7554 1.073 1
0611101400 235189 8628 8006 1.078 2
0611111400 255615 6474 5967 1.085 4
0611121400 213340 4510 3811 1.183 4
0611131400 210786 11207 9414 1.190 4
0611141400 233472 8746 8251 1.059 4
0611151400 258144 8884 8262 1.075 4
M2C
Network Trace Unique NEM # of Avg HEM File Size
IPs Size HEMs Size(services) MBytes
0309030410 33666 171 167 1.024 84
0309031005 24323 693 685 1.012 234
0309031700 39706 482 470 1.026 196
0309040410 33840 29 26 1.115 51
0309041005 45785 695 676 1.028 248
0309041700 48992 441 417 1.058 187
0309050410 18267 53 49 1.082 58
0309051005 35950 708 696 1.017 311
0309051700 31824 391 375 1.043 144
0309060410 21993 49 40 1.225 81
0309061005 14541 56 52 1.077 52
0309061700 20992 71 64 1.109 55
0309070410 44882 31 28 1.107 56
0309071005 69354 100 92 1.109 107
0309071700 42307 62 56 1.107 78
0309080400 25368 39 35 1.114 47
0309081005 33972 889 869 1.023 378
0309081700 57374 613 597 1.027 223
0309090400 29484 32 32 1.000 47
0309091005 71293 886 829 1.069 378
0309091700 40234 686 650 1.055 223
20